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CASE NOTES

hood, was found to be based on an "impermissible ground" because it was
impossible to determine whether the basis of liability was intent to injure or
intent to injure through falsehood. 5 3 There is absent in Sprouse clear evidence of intent to inflict harm through falsehood, in the light of knowledge
of falsity or reckless and willful disregard of the truth, which must not be
confused with mere adversity.
Failure to recognize this subtlety pervades the entire holding of Sprouse
and explains the dependency of the scheme to injure by defamation on the
departure from objective news reporting.5 4 Thus, it is impossible for the evidentiary aspects in Sprouse to support a scheme to defame because the proposition is founded upon evidence of intent to injure.55 The proposition of a
scheme to defame as evidence of "actual malice" is, however, constitutionally
sound, provided that it dissects this notion of impartiality and is sustained
by evidence of intent to inflict harm through falsehood. Once a scheme to
defame is proven, the addition of an unreasonable, exaggerated headline
would be superfluous. The cumulative design is only necessary where evidence of knowledge or reckless and willful disregard is inadequate. Although Sprouse purports to operate within the confines of New York Times,
acknowledging the standard of "actual malice," 56 it neglects the constitutional
principles underlying the privilege of "robustly" criticizing those who have
chosen the political arena. Sprouse presents a constitutionally sound formula
for proving "actual malice," yet manipulates the standard in fatal neglect of
those commitments for which it was promulgated. This constitutional
privilege will not condone cumulative evidence founded on a proposition of
"temperate," uninvolved, inertly objective news-reporting to show "actual
malice" where in fact there is only "malice."
John Powell Covington

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due Process-Ex Parte
Garnishment Statute Held Invalid
North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem. Inc.,
__

U.S.

-,

95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975).

'Di-Chem, Inc. filed suit against North Georgia Finishing, Inc. alleging
indebtedness due for goods sold and delivered. Simultaneously with the filing of the complaint and prior to its service on North Georgia Finishing, Inc.,
53. Id. at 9-11.

54. Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1975).
55. Id. at 691-92.
56. Id. at 681-82.
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the clerk of the court issued a writ of garnishment on bank accounts of the
corporation upon the sworn affidavit of Di-Chem, Inc., filed in accordance
with Georgia garnishment procedure. After filing the required bond to
dissolve the garnishment, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the writ and discharge the bond alleging that the garnishment effected
a violation of its right of due process under the fourteenth amendment. The
trial court overruled the motion, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.'
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Held-Reversed and remanded. The Georgia garnishment statute, permitting a court clerk to issue a writ of garnishment in pending suits upon an
affidavit of the plaintiff containing only conclusory allegations and providing
for the filing of a bond as the only method of dissolving the garnishment,
deprives a debtor of the use of his property pending litigation and results in
2
an unconstitutional denial of due process.
The Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."'3 Procedural due process
requires that legal proceedings which may result in a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property be conducted in accordance with those rules and
principles established in our system of jurisprudence for the enforcement and
protection of private rights. 4 Implicit in the meaning of procedural due
process is the assumption that any person whose rights will be affected by
an action is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. 5 Such notice
and hearing "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner." 6
Until recently, creditors' prejudgment seizures have been free from constitutional attack. 7 Prejudgment remedies have long been accepted in commercial law as methods by which a creditor may protect himself from loss
when a debtor defaults on a debt or threatens to destroy, conceal, or remove
from the jurisdiction property in which the creditor has an interest. 8
1. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 201 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 1973),
rev'd and remanded, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975).
2. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., - U.S. -, -, 95 S. Ct. 719,
723, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751, 758 (1975).
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877); see New Orleans Waterworks
Co. v. Louisana, 185 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1902); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.12, § 1821 (1967);
Note, Summary Prejudgment Repossession and Procedural Due Process, 12 Hous. L.
REv. 200, 201 (1974).
5. E.g., Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944); Shields v. Utah
I. Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177, 182 (1938); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
6. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
7. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., - U.S.-, -, 95 S. Ct.

719, 724, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751, 759 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611-14 (1974).

8. The purpose of a prejudgment seizure isto assure the availability of property for
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Generally, prejudgment seizure statutes authorize a clerk, justice of the
peace, or judge in an ex parte proceeding upon the sworn affidavit of a creditor to issue a writ directing a sheriff or constable to seize specified property
belonging to a debtor." Traditionally, notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to such seizures have not been required, the view being that if the
ultimate judicial determination of liability were adequate, postponement of
such a determination would not be a denial of due process where only
property rights were concerned. 10
Prior to 1969, constitutional challenges of prejudgment seizures on due

process grounds were believed to be precluded by the Supreme Court's holding in McKay v. Mclnnes." In that case, the Court affirmed per curiam
the decision of the Supreme Court of Maine declaring Maine's attachment
statute constitutionally sound.' 2 The Maine Court held that attachmenta temporary deprivation of property-was not within the scope of the
deprivation contemplated by the Constitution. Even if it were, it was not
without "due process" since it was a part of a legislatively established
the satisfaction of the judgment which a plaintiff may obtain. Common prejudgment
seizures include: (1) attachment-a proceeding whereby a defendant's property is taken
into custody pending adjudication of the rights of the parties and usually issued in cases
involving non-resident defendants, fraud, or attempts to conceal or dispose of property on
the part of a defendant, Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor
Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 365 (1973); (2) garnishment- a proceeding in which a plaintiff seeks to claim property of a defendant in the hands of a third
person or money owed by the third person to the defendant; generally available under
the same circumstances as' attachment of tangible personal property, Note, Debtor and
Creditor-Due Process-Sequestrationof Property Without Prior Notice and Hearing to
Debtor Does Not Violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 150, 156
n.46 (1974); (3) replevin-a possessory action to determine a plaintiff's right to
possession of property which a defendant has wrongfully taken or wrongfully retained
against the plaintiff's demand, Ring v. Ring, 174 N.E.2d 58, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1961);
and (4) sequestration-a proceeding in which a disinterested party retains possession of
the property pending a final judgment in the litigation wherein the plaintiff's assertion of
right to possession is based on a claim of ownership or a mortgage or lien on the
sequestered property, Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Supreme Court Moderates Prior Notice and Hearing Requirements for Provisional Seizures, 49 TuL. L. REV.
467 n.1 (1975). See generally Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and
Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003
and 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1973); Krahmer, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the
Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 23, 30-41 (1972); Note,
Sell-Help Repossession: The Constitutional Attack, The Legislative Response, and The
Economic Implications, 62 GEO. L.J. 273 (1973).
9. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 275 (1973), 4076 (1966), 6840 (1960);
Tax. R. Ov. P. 657-79. See generally 77 C.J.S. Replevin §§ 93-111 (1952); 38 C.J.S.
Garnishment § 150 (1943).
10. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931).
11. 279 U.S. 820 (1928).
12. Mclnnes v. McKay, 141 A. 699 (Me.), afJ'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1928).
As authority for its decision, the Maine Supreme Court cited two earlier United States
Supreme Court cases upholding the validity of prejudgment seizures on constitutional
grounds. Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 US. 29 (1928) (establishing prejudgment
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procedure during which notice and a hearing before an authorized tribunal
3
were provided.1
In 1969, however, the Court departed from its previous decisions and in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.' 4 held a Wisconsin garnishment statute' 5
unconstitutional because it allowed wages to be frozen without any prior
notice or opportunity for a hearing. The majority opinion described wages
as "a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our
economic system"'" and thus raised doubts about the applicability of that
decision to other prejudgment procedures and property other than necessities.' 7 Three years later in Fuentes v. Shevin,' 8 the Court dispelled such
doubts by declaring Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes unconstitutional.' 9 Relying on Sniadach and subsequent decisions, 20 the Court held
that the protections of the fourteenth amendment applied to any deprivation

of a significant property interest, whether final or temporary. 21 The Court
concluded that the statutes in question resulted in a deprivation of property
prior opwithout due process of law "insofar as they [deny] the right to a 22
possessor.
their
from
taken
are
chattels
portunity to be heard before
liens on the property of insolvent banks); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921)
(upholding Delaware foreign attachment procedures).
13. Mclnnes v. McKay, 141 A. 699, 702-703 (Me.), af!'d per curiam, 279 U.S. 820
(1928).
14. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
15. Wis. L. 1966, ch. 507, § 1.
16. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
17. In other jurisdictions, some courts construed Sniadach to condemn only wage
garnishment. See, e.g., Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga.
1971); Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Termplan,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 463 P.2d 68 (Ariz. 1969). Others viewed Sniadach as conclusive
on questions involving other summary creditor remedies. See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate
Dept. of Super. Ct., 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Jones
Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 176 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1970); Larson v.
Fetherson, 172 N.W.2d 20 (Wis. 1969). For a thorough review of this area of the law
and its developments prior to the instant case see Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes
and Beyond: The CreditorMeets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355 (1973); Gardner,
Fuentes v. Shevin: The New York Creditor and Replevin, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 17
(1972); Krahmer, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and The Consumer, A Legal and
Empirical Study, 4 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 23 (1972); Note, Procedural Due Process-The
Prior Hearing Rule and the Demise of Ex Parte Remedies, 53 BoSTON U.L. REV. 41

(1973).
18. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01, 78.07, 78.08, 78.10, 78.13 (Supp. 1972-1973); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1821 (1967); PA. R.J.A. 1073, 1076, 1077 (1975).
20. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
379 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
21. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85-87 (1972).
22. Id. at 96. On the basis of the decision in Fuentes, courts across the country
invalidated prejudgment remedies. See, e.g., Morgan v. Wofford, 472 F.2d 822 (5th Cir.
1973); Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Law Research Serv., Inc.,
386 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Thompson v. Keesee, 375 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Ky.
1974); Morrow Elec. Co. v. Cruse, 370 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1974); State ex rel.
Williams v. Berrey, 492 S.W. 2d 731 (Mo. 1973); Montoya v. Blackhurst, 500 P.2d 176
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Two years later, in a surprising reversal, the Court in Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co. 23 upheld the constitutionality of a Louisiana sequestration procedure which permitted seizure of a debtor's property without notice and a prior
hearing. The Louisiana statutes authorized a judge to issue a writ of
sequestration in an ex parte proceeding upon a creditor's application for the

writ by verified affidavit. 2 4 The statutes provided that the affidavit must
contain specific facts concerning the nature of the claim, the amount and the
grounds relied upon for issuance of the writ.2 5 Furthermore the creditor was
required to furnish a bond sufficient to pay any damages the debtor might
sustain. 2 6 The debtor could seek immediate dissolution of the writ unless
the creditor proved the grounds for its issuance.27 Mitchell distinguished
Sniadach on the basis of the dissimilar nature of the respective creditors'

interests involved, noting that the creditor in Sniadach had no prior interest
in the garnished wages while the installment seller in Mitchell had a special
interest in the sequestered property due to his security lien.28

Fuentes was

distinguished in terms of the requirements for issuance of a writ contained
in the statutes involved. 2 9 Five specific debtor protection provisions within
the Louisiana procedure were found to be lacking in the Pennsylvania and

Florida statutes invalidated by Fuentes.30

After weighing the interests of

(N.M. 1972). Contra, e.g., McVay v. United States, 481 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1973);
Velazco v. Minter, 481 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1973); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.,
466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Central Sec. Nat'l
Bank v. Royal Homes, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Harrison v. Morris,
370 F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974).
23. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
24. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 281-83 (1960), 3501 (1961).
25. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts 2501, 3571 (1961).
26. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 3501, 3506, 3574 (1961).
27. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3506 (1961).
28. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614-15 (1974). The Court also noted
that there was no showing in Sniadach of how soon the debtor could have a hearing and
that garnishments were subject to abuse by creditors without valid claims, a risk
minimized in this case by the creditor's security interest in the property and the debtor
protections furnished by the statute. Id. at 614-15.
29. Id. at 615. The Court also discussed the fact that the fault standard of "wrongful
detention" required for issuance of a writ of replevin was peculiarly subject to factual
determination and adversarial input while grounds for possession under a writ of
sequestration could easily be shown in an ex parte proceeding by production of
documentary proof of the debt, the default, and the vendor's lien. Id. at 617-18. This
approach does not take into consideration any defenses which the debtor may have.

Comment, Prejudgment Remedies and Due Process Rights: A Question of Balance, 6

L. REV. 185, 203 n.76 (1974).
30. The five protections are: (1) the affiant's personal knowledge of the facts
contained in a "verified" affidavit; (2) "specific" facts contained in the affidavit
supporting the allegations of entitlement to the property and reason to fear loss if the
writ is not granted; (3) judicial determination of right to the relief requested; (4) filing
of a bond by the creditor for protection of the debtor should the writ be shown to have
been improvidently granted; and (5) an opportunity for an early hearing after seizure to
determine the plaintiff's right to seizure on the merits of the case. Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616-18 (1974).
TOLEDO
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both buyer and seller in the disputed property3l and considering the debtor
protections furnished by the provisions of the Louisiana statutes, the Court
concluded that the sequestration procedure was valid, and that it effected a
"constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties."'3 2
In light of the unequivocal holding in Fuentes that notice and a prior opportunity for a hearing are due process requirements, it appears that Mitchell
overruled Fuentes.3 3 Mitchell did not, however, expressly overrule Fuentes
although it certainly placed Fuentes in a questionable category.a4 Instead
of the clear mandate of Fuentes, Mitchell substituted a less stringent test, a
type of balancing of the opposing interests of buyer and seller coupled with
a consideration of the degree of debtor protection furnished by the provisions
of the statute in question. The Court failed to suggest guidelines to
determine what or how many of the debtor protection elements enumerated
must be contained in a statute meeting constitutional requirements. Finally,
the opinion implies that it was limited solely to those situations where both
buyer and seller had a prior interest in the property seized.
Thus, the judicial atmosphere surrounding prejudgment seizures was rather
uncertain when North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.3a5 was
decided. In that case, a writ of garnishment was obtained by a creditor on
the basis of an affidavit containing conclusory allegations of a debt and reason
to fear the loss of the garnished amount. The debtor, North Georgia Finishing, Inc., sought dissolution of the writ, asserting that the Georgia garnishment statute violated due process requirements. 3
The Supreme Court
agreed with the debtor and reversed the decision of the Georgia Supreme
37
Court, by relying on the holdings in Sniadach, Fuentes and Mitchell.
The Georgia courts recognized that Sniadach invalidated a garnishment
statute but they considered it applicable only to garnishment of wages, not
31.

The Court placed considerable weight on the fact that the creditor had a prior

interest in the property sequestered in the form of a vendor's lien on goods purchased
under an installment sales contract. Id. at 604-605.

32. Id. at 607.
33. The concurring and dissenting Justices all felt that Mitchell was "constitutionally
indistinguishable" from Fuentes and, therefore, overruled Fuentes. Id. at 623, 634, 636.
34. Both Fuentes and Sniadach recognized that occasionally there might be "extraor-

dinary situations" which would justify postponing notice and an opportunity for a
hearing. One such situation occurs when there is shown to exist a special need for

prompt action. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969). It has been suggested that Mitchell could have avoided

this potential conflict with Fuentes by holding that the creditor's interest in preventing
the alienation, destruction, or further deterioration of the property by continued use
created such a situation requiring prompt action. Note, Constitutional Law-Due
Process-Ex Parte Prejudgment Replevin Statute Held Valid, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 742, 747
(1974).

35. -

U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975).

36. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-101-104 (1974).

37. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 201 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 1973),
rev'd and remanded, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975).
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other assets or properties. 38 The Supreme Court disagreed, arguing that such
an application of Sniadach failed to recognize Fuentes.3 9 Discussing Fuentes,
the Court stated that the official seizures in that case were held to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment because they had been "carried out without
notice and without opportunity for a hearing or other safeguard against
mistaken repossession. ' 40 The Georgia statute was vulnerable for the same
reasons.
The provisions of the Georgia statute were also compared with the provisions of the Louisiana sequestration statute considered constitutional in
Mitchell, and were found devoid of the necessary debtor protection provisions. 4 1 Finally, the Court declared Fuentes and Mitchell applicable although based in an individual debtor-creditor context, since the due process
clause applies to all types of property, the deprivation of which might lead
42
to irreparable injury.

North Georgia is unilluminating in that it contains no positive statements
of the applicable law.43 Apparently the intention of the Court was to reverse
the Georgia courts while offering few reasons for doing So.44 The comparisons drawn between the Georgia statute and those in Fuentes and Mitchell
are mere suggestions of factors to be considered, and the opinion never
indicates which provides the controlling authority for the invalidation of the

statute.
What emerges from the Court's opinion is a test to ascertain whether or
not due process requirements have been met. For example, a prejudgment
seizure statute should first be compared with the holding in Fuentes to
determine if the statute provides for the requisite notice and opportunity for
a hearing prior to seizure. If it does, then any further consideration of due
process questions would be unnecessary. If the requirements of Fuentes are
38. Id. at 323.
39. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., - U.S. -, -, 95 S. Ct. 719,
722, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751, 756 (1975).
40. Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 722, 42 L.Ed. 2d at 757.
41. Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 722-23, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 757-58.
42. Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 723, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 758.
43. The one exception is the Court's ruling that the due process clause applies to
deprivations of property belonging to corporations. Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 723, 42 L. Ed.
2d at 758.
44. The Court concluded its opinion by stating that "[e]nough has been said, we
think, to require the reversal of the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court." Id. at
-, 95 S. Ct. at 723, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 758. This contention is supported by Justice
Blackmun's dissenting opinion in which he states:
One gains the impression . . . that the Court is endeavoring to say as little as possible in explaining just why the Supreme Court of Georgia is being reversed. And,
as a result, the corresponding commercial statutes of all other States, similar to but
not exactly like those of Florida or Pennsylvania or Louisiana or Georgia, are left
in questionable constitutional status, with little or no applicable standard by which
to measure and determine their validity under the Fourteenth Amendment.
id. at -, 95 S.Ct. at 726, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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not met, then another comparison of the specific provisions of the statute with
those discussed in Mitchell should be made to determine the constitutionality
of the statute. In other words, Fuentes represents an ideal standard while
Mitchell should be used to judge those statutes falling below that standard. 45
The mere suggestions in the North Georgia opinion fail to disburse the uncertainty surrounding the Mitchell decision. The fact that Mitchell was
decided on issues concerning seizure of property in which both debtor and
creditor had a prior interest is never discussed in North Georgia, yet the use
of Mitchell as authority for the holding in North Georgia indicates that
Mitchell is not limited solely to its circumstances. After North Georgia the
status of Fuentes in light of Mitchell is still debatable. 46 More importantly,
however, while North Georgia offers support for the "balancing test" of
debtor and creditor interests adopted by the Mitchell court, there is no indication which debtor protection provisions are required to sustain a statute
against constitutional attack.
In considering which of the "saving characteristics" of the Louisiana statute
are necessary to meet the constitutional requirement of due process, three
are suggested. First, a statute should require that a creditor post a bond sufficient to cover any damages, including expenses and attorney's fees, which
the debtor may incur if the seizure is found to be error. 4 7 Second, the statute
should require that the affidavit contain sufficient facts from which a
determination could be made of probable cause for the seizure. 4s Third,
such a statute should provide the debtor with an early opportunity to present
45. This precise test was applied by a federal district court in Texas which declared
the Texas sequestration statute unconstitutional. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840
(1960). In that case, the court said that "[t]he Texas Sequestration statute fails to
comply with prior notice and hearing requirements of Fuentes and does not measure up
to the standards approved by the Supreme Court in Mitchell. . . . [The sequestration
procedure does] not meet constitutional muster .... " Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp.
1254, 1259 (S.D. Tex. 1974). See also Comment, Prejudgment Remedies and Due
Process Rights: A Question of Balance, 6 TOLEDO L. REV. 185, 206-13 (1974).
46. Despite the fact that the concurring Justices and two of the dissenting Justices
concluded that the majority opinion of North Georgia appeared to reinstate Fuentes, a
closer reading of the majority opinion reveals that the notice and hearing requirements of
Fuentes are never relied upon solely as controlling but are always coupled with a third
factor such as the absence of judicial participation in the issuance of the writ. From a
broader viewpoint, it can be seen that Fuentes is cited for its analysis of the replevin
statutes and its discussion of property deprivations to which due process applies rather
than for its holding regarding notice and hearing. It can hardly be said that North
Georgia fully reinstates Fuentes. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DI-Chem, Inc., U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975).
47. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 608 (1974); see Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 101-102 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
48. Cf., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). One article has suggested that a
temporary restraining order with its requisite showing of irreparable harm to the plaintiff
if the order is not issued would be an appropriate remedy when the need arises for
complete summary creditor relief. Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The
Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 404-405 (1973).
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his defenses in a hearing on the merits. 49 Finally, the statute should not
require the filing of a bond by the debtor before a hearing since that might
constitute a denial of equal protection to persons of low income. 50
The uncertainty of the Supreme Court on issues involving due process,
evidenced by North Georgia, is indicative of a fundamental split among the
members of the Court as to exactly what statutory procedures are required

by "due process." 5 1 Apparently, the majority of the Court advocate a
"balancing test" to resolve due process issues relating to prejudgment
seizures-weighing the competing property interests of both debtor and
creditor in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances.

It seems

likely, therefore, that subsequent questions of due process based on statutory

52
construction will conform to the rationale in Mitchell and North Georgia.
Hopefully, later decisions by the Supreme Court will settle the issues remaining unresolved in the decision in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,

Inc.

53

Caroline W. Jackson

49. Parts of the Mitchell decision indicate that the Court might have considered
judicial supervision to be the controlling factor in determining the constitutionality of the
statute, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616-17, 620 n.14 (1974). As
noted in Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Mitchell, however, issuance of a writ
quickly becomes a ministerial act after a determination of "the formal sufficiency of the
plaintiff's allegations." Id. at 632 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For this reason, it is suggested
that judicial determination would not be a requirement for compliance with due process.
Accord, North Georgia Finishing, ,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., - U.S. , , 95 S. Ct. 719,
725, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751, 760 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
50. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., - U.S. , , 95 S. Ct. 719,
726, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751, 761 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); cf., Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 347 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). But cf. United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973).
51. Generally, Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart are in favor of a
due process requirement of notice and prior hearing in questions relating to prejudgment
seizures while the remaining Justices support the use of a balancing test. E.g., Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). It should
be noted that the thrust of the dissenting opinion in North Georgia dealt not with the
due process test to be used but with its applicability to commercial dealings between
corporations. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., - U.S. -, -, 95 S. Ct.
719, 728-29, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751, 764-65 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,dissenting). The basic split
may also be found in due process decisions in areas other than prejudgment seizures. See
e.g., Goss v. Lopez, - U.S. -,
95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed.2d 725 (1975); Arnett v.
Kennedy, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 40 L. Ed.2d 15 (1974); Weinberger v. Hynson,
Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973); Torres v. New York State Dept. of
Labor, 410 U.S. 971 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
52. See Comment, Prejudgment Remedies and Due Process Rights: A Question of
Balance, 6 TOLEDo L. REv. 185, 206-13 (1974).
53. - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975).
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